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When participants are asked to spontaneously categorize a set of items, they typically 
produce unidimensional classifications, i.e. categorize the items on the basis of only 
one of their dimensions of variation. We examine whether it is possible to predict 
unidimensional vs. two-dimensional classification on the basis of the abstract stimulus 
structure, by employing Pothos and Chater’s (2002) simplicity model of spontaneous 
categorization. The simplicity model provides a quantitative measure of how intuitive 
a particular classification is. With objects represented in two dimensions, we propose 
that a unidimensional classification will be preferred if it is more intuitive than all 
possible two-dimensional ones, and vice versa. Empirical results supporting this 
proposal are reported. Implications for Goodman’s paradox are discussed. 
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Introduction  
When people encounter a new set of objects, they sometimes recognize that there is 
an intuitive grouping for these objects. This process of spontaneous (unsupervised) 
categorization has been researched separately from that of supervised categorization 
(where a grouping of objects is learned); the latter has produced influential modeling 
approaches, such as exemplar (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1989) and prototype theory 
(Hampton, 2003). A relevant intriguing finding is that when spontaneously grouping a 
set of objects, people sometimes ignore some of their dimensions of variation. For 
example, in a simple case of objects varying in length and width (e.g., rectangles), 
participants might ignore length and group only on the basis of width. What prompts 
participants to ignore perceptual information in spontaneous categorization? We will 
suggest an account of when this is likely to happen, on the basis of the abstract 
similarity structure of the stimuli (as opposed to, for example, factors relating to 
procedure or stimulus format; Milton & Wills, 2004; Milton, 2006). The proposed 
approach can, in principle, be applied to both stimuli of continuous dimensions (of 
physical variation) and stimuli made of binary dimensions.  
 The relevant laboratory finding is that when participants spontaneously 
classify a set of objects they generally do so in terms of only one of the objects’ 
dimensions (Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999; Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 
1987; Regehr & Brooks, 1995; for corresponding results in supervised categorization 
see, e.g., Kruschke, 1993). Indeed, some categorization models have taken the 
prevalence of unidimensional classifications almost as axiomatic (Ahn & Medin, 
1992; Nosofsky, Palmeri, and McKinley, 1994). Why do participants appear to prefer 
unidimensional classifications? An intuitive demonstration can be found in Ashby et 
al. (1999). These investigators considered data sets as shown in Figure 1a, finding that 
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participants preferred to classify the corresponding exemplars along a single 
dimension (dimension x in Figure 1a). Observe that along dimension x there is a well-
defined two-cluster category structure, whereas by taking into account dimension y as 
well, the resulting category structure is a lot less intuitive. This observation is the 
basis of our modeling approach.  
---------------------FIGURE 1---------------------- 
 To suggest that unidimensional classification is always preferred is 
counterintuitive. First, the literature on basic level categorization shows a preference 
for categories maximizing within- and minimizing between-category similarity across 
all dimensions (e.g., Gosselin & Schyns, 2001; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Second, there 
are some spontaneous categorization results that do show multidimensional (family 
resemblance) classification (e.g., Medin et al., 1987; Milton & Wills, 2004). Finally, 
intuitively, when categorizing novel objects in the real world, we do not single out 
one dimension, but instead take into account all available useful information. From an 
adaptive perspective, a system that indiscriminately ‘ignores’ much of the available 
information is likely to miss out on important aspects of its environment.  
 However, as noted earlier, in experimental settings, the cognitive system does 
appear to often ignore much of the available information. Our aim is to explain some 
of these conflicting results and intuitions, by providing a model which predicts 
preference for unidimensional vs. multidimensional classification, on the basis of the 
abstract similarity structure of a set of objects. 
 
Modeling framework 
Consider stimuli constructed from two dimensions of physical variation (x, y). Such 
stimuli can be categorized by taking into account dimension x only, dimension y only, 
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or both dimensions equally weighted. For each of these cases, there will be a 
classification for the stimuli that is most natural/intuitive, denoted as Group(…). 
Group(x), Group(y), Group(x,y), therefore, indicate three classifications, by taking 
into account dimension x only, y only, or both, respectively.  
 The intuitiveness of Group(x) vs. Group(y) vs. Group(x,y) is not necessarily 
the same. In Figure 1a, Group(x) is an obvious two-category structure. By contrast, 
imagine all the points in Figure 1a collapsed along the y dimension: here we end up 
with homogeneous variation along y, there is no obvious category structure. Finally, 
Group(x,y) looks a bit like Group(x), but it is not as intuitive since the variation along 
the y dimension introduces noise.  
 Group(x), Group(y), Group(x,y) can therefore vary in intuitiveness. Our 
proposal is based on two assumptions: first, the cognitive system can evaluate the 
intuitiveness of Group(x), Group(y), Group(x,y) concurrently. Such an assumption is 
analogous to computational approaches in perception, whereby it is typically assumed 
that several interpretations of a distal layout become available, and can be considered, 
concurrently (Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986). Second, the cognitive system will prefer 
unidimensional classification along dimension x (or y) if the intuitiveness of Group(x) 
(or Group(y)) is greater than that of Group(x,y). Otherwise, the cognitive system will 
prefer a two-dimensional classification. The intuition is that if additional dimensions 
do not contribute to (or reduce) the well-formedness of a category structure, then they 
are ignored.  
 To complete the model, what is missing is a measure of category intuitiveness. 
There are several candidate models, and an exhaustive examination is simply 
impractical. Therefore, we presently consider three candidate models of unsupervised 
dimensions in spontaneous classification  6 
categorization: the Rational model (Anderson, 1991), SUSTAIN (Love, Medin, & 
Gureckis, 2004), and the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002).  
 Rational Model 
Anderson’s (1991) Rational model is a Bayesian model of categorization (e.g., 
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). A new instance, with feature structure F, is 
classified to the category k, for which the product )|()( kFPkP  is greatest (or, it may 
be assigned to a new category). For example, if you see a new object that looks like a 
‘cat’, assign it to the category of cats, since the feature structure of the object is most 
probable given this category membership. The term )|( kFP is estimated by taking 
into account the expected prior distribution of property values, for each property. For 
example, if property values vary continuously, )|( kFP will be calculated on the basis 
of a t-distribution, whose parameters depend on the range and mean of the property 
values.  
The Rational Model is a model of incremental learning. It starts with no 
categories; at each step it decides how a novel instance should be categorized, and in 
this way eventually builds a classification for a set of stimuli. However, given two 
alternative categorizations for the same set of items, it is not possible to decide which 
one is psychologically more intuitive. For example, if we consider the Figure 1 
stimuli, the Rational Model will very likely produce different classifications 
depending on whether the stimuli are represented along x or xy. However, there is no 
way to compare the relative goodness of these two classifications and so predict, e.g., 
a preference for unidimensional classification. Moreover, there is a parameter in the 
Rational Model (the coupling parameter) which effectively determines how many 
categories will be produced for a set of items. As discussed later, this may bias 
participants to employ one or all of the available dimensions (cf. Murphy. 2004). 
dimensions in spontaneous classification  7 
Overall, the Rational Model cannot be used in the present situation and also, 
generally, it is not clear whether it can make predictions with respect to 1d vs. 2d 
classification preference. This is not to say that an alternative Bayesian approach may 
not provide a compelling account of 1d vs. 2d classification, as Cheng et al.’s (2007) 
recent review illustrates.  
SUSTAIN 
SUSTAIN (Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004) is a model that aims to capture the full 
continuum between supervised and unsupervised categorization. SUSTAIN is more 
powerful than either pure supervised or pure unsupervised categorization models. Its 
supervised component is derived from Kruschke’s (1992) ALCOVE model. It 
involves attentional parameters which modulate the salience of different dimensions 
in the classification of novel instances. SUSTAIN’s unsupervised component is 
primarily driven by two principles. First, there is a principle of similarity, favoring 
groupings that maximize within-category similarity, while minimizing between-
category similarity. Second, SUSTAIN reacts to ‘surprising’ events. So, for example, 
if it encounters a novel instance that does not fit well into any of its existing clusters, 
it is likely to create a new cluster. There is a parameter that determines how far a new 
instance has to be from existing categories before a new cluster is created; therefore, 
this parameter indirectly determines the number of categories. Although Love et al. 
(2004) did constrain this parameter to a specific value in their simulations (which was 
determined on a priori grounds), its existence somewhat confuses the issue of 1d vs. 
2d classification (see the section on Methodological issues).  
 The attentional parameters of SUSTAIN allow it to model 1d vs. 2d 
dissociations. The simulations reported by Love et al. (2004) enable some insight into 
how SUSTAIN achieves this. It appears that when stimuli are made up of dimensions 
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that do not inter-correlate with each other, or correlate with each other only partially, 
then SUSTAIN tends to produce unsupervised classifications on the basis of a single 
dimension—the selected dimension depends on order effects in stimulus presentation 
(once SUSTAIN starts to build a clustering, it then adjusts the attentional weights to 
favor that clustering, i.e., to make clusters more well-separated). By contrast, 
SUSTAIN will produce 2d classifications when the two dimensions are highly 
correlated with each other. In cases where there are pairs of correlated dimensions, 
higher correlation implies higher probability that SUSTAIN will focus on the 
particular pair of dimensions (Gureckis, personal communication). The importance of 
dimensional inter-correlation has been highlighted before, for example in the 
unsupervised learning study of Billman and Knutson (1996). These investigators 
reported results which basically support SUSTAIN’s prediction. 
 In sum, SUSTAIN can predict unidimensional vs. multidimensional 
preference. However, SUSTAIN does not provide a value indicating category 
intuitiveness, and so cannot be used in our proposal for 1d vs. 2d classification (for 
which it is necessary to compare Group(x) and Group(x,y)).  
 Simplicity 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) suggested that basic level categories maximize within- and 
minimize between-category similarity. This intuition can, in principle, allow us to 
predict the preferred spontaneous categorization for a set of objects. Pothos and 
Chater (2002, 2005) used the simplicity principle to provide a computational 
framework for Rosch and Mervis’s suggestion. Simplicity is a principle of 
information theory which has been argued to have psychological relevance (Chater, 
1999; Feldman, 2000). In its most common form, it states that when there are 
alternative explanations for a data set, the simplest one should be preferred. In 
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categorization, the similarity information between a set of objects can be considered 
the ‘data’, which we try to ‘explain’ with different classifications.  
 The simplicity model first computes the information content of all the 
similarity relations between a set of objects. Categories are defined as imposing 
constraints on these similarity relations, so that all the objects belonging to a category 
are assumed to be more similar to each other, than to any pair of objects belonging to 
different categories. Therefore, using categories can reduce the information required 
to describe some objects’ similarity structure, if there are numerous and correct such 
constraints. Where there are wrong constraints, some information is required to 
correct them. Also, specifying an assignment of objects into categories requires some 
information. Overall, we can compute the codelength for a set of objects categorized 
in a particular way as, {information required before categorization} minus 
{constraints minus costs from errors and costs from specifying the category 
structure}. The shorter (lower value) the codelength, the more intuitive the 
categorization is predicted to be (Figure 2; Appendix). Note that for different sets of 
objects the codelength for the best possible classification may be different, depending 
on how objects are arranged relative to each other in psychological space (Figure 3). 
The simplicity model can compute most intuitive classifications without any 
parameters (including number of categories). Therefore, it is suitable for further 
specifying our proposal for unidimensional vs. two-dimensional classification.  
Finally, as previously noted, SUSTAIN creates new clusters as a reaction to 
‘surprising’ events, e.g., encountering new instances that do not fit into the existing 
clusters. ‘Surprisingness’ is fundamental to information theory, and therefore the 
unsupervised part of SUSTAIN is plausibly similar to the simplicity model. 
Moreover, the Rational model is a Bayesian estimator. However, Bayesian and 
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simplicity approaches can be made equivalent with an appropriate choice of priors 
(Chater, 1996). Therefore, implementational differences may obscure intimate 
relationships between the three models.  
---------------------FIGURES 2,3---------------------- 
 
A proposal for 1d vs. 2d classification 
Consider again the most intuitive classification along x, y, or by taking into account 
both dimensions – Group(x), Group(y), Group(x,y). Using the simplicity model, each 
of these classifications can be associated with a codelength value, that determines 
how obvious/natural it ought to appear to naïve observers. If Codelength(Group(x)) or 
Codelength(Group(y)) are less than Codelength(Group(x,y)), then predict a preference 
for unidimensional spontaneous classification (henceforth, Codelength(Group(x)) is 
denoted as Codelength(x), etc.) If Codelength(x,y) is less than Codelength(x) and 
Codelength(y), then predict a preference for two-dimensional spontaneous 
classification. Note that even though the simplicity model has been used in the 
formulation of our proposal, it is not necessary: any model that can compute category 
intuitiveness without information about the number of categories sought, would have 
been equally adequate. As it happens, of the three models of unsupervised 
categorization we considered, simplicity was the only one which satisfied these 
requirements.  
We recognize that a preference for unidimensional vs. two-dimensional 
classification may be determined by other biases as well. For example, Regehr and 
Brooks (1995) and Milton and Wills (2004; Milton, 2006) highlighted the importance 
of procedural details and stimulus format. Medin et al. (1987) observed that a set of 
stimuli are more likely to be spontaneously classified on the basis of more than one 
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dimension, when there was a way to causally link some of the dimensions (cf. 
Wattenmaker et al., 1986, who found that the theme of the stimulus domain could 
influence whether a linearly separable classification is favored or not). The 
contribution of the present work is that it identifies a way to understand biases on 1d 
vs. 2d classification arising from the abstract similarity structure of a set of items. In 
some previous studies, such biases have been considered random. For example, 
Medin et al. (1987, p.33) state “…there may be no general answer to the question of 
which partitioning of some abstract structure of a set of examples is more natural” (a 
similar conclusion was reached by Regehr & Brooks, 1995). Thus, the simplicity 
approach complements Love et al.’s (2004) effort in this direction, since SUSTAIN 
can also predict preference for 1d vs. 2d classification, largely independent of 
stimulus format/ procedure. SUSTAIN’s predictions are further discussed after we 
report our empirical findings.  
Will it be possible to integrate biases on 1d vs. 2d classification from stimulus 
format/ procedure, general knowledge, and abstract stimulus structure, into a single, 
unifying model? Ideally yes, but currently there are no clues as to how this could be 
achieved (cf. Milton & Wills, 2004).  
 
Examining previous findings 
The present approach can be readily illustrated with a simplified version of Ashby et 
al.’s (1999) data set, shown in Figure 1a. We created a data set of 20 points, 10 points 
along each ‘strip’. Both dimensions were assumed to vary from 1 to 10. Similarities 
between points were computed using the Euclidean metric. We then used simplicity to 
determine Codelength(x) and Codelength(x,y). Codelength values are given in terms 
of a percentage that reflects the number of bits required to encode the objects’ 
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similarity structure with categories, relative to how many bits are required to encode 
the same similarity structure without categories. Accordingly, the lower this 
percentage value, the smaller the codelength, and so the more intuitive the 
corresponding classification is predicted to be (Pothos & Chater, 2002, 2005).  
 Codelength(x) was 50.07% and Codelength(x,y) was 80.83%. That Group(x) is 
predicted to be so much more intuitive compared to Group(x,y) is a straightforward 
implication of the fact that along the x dimension there are two extremely well-
separated clusters, whereas, in the xy plane, many between-cluster similarities are 
actually greater than within-cluster similarities. Hence, the present formalism readily 
predicts that, for the data set in Figure 1a, dimension y will be ignored and 
participants should spontaneously classify the items unidimensionally, along 
dimension x (consistently with Ashby et al.’s, 1999, findings).  
 Ashby et al. (1999) also employed data sets as shown in Figure 1b. In such 
cases, there was no evidence for a preference either for a two-dimensional 
classification (xy) or a unidimensional one (in fact, the two-dimensional classification 
could not be learnt without feedback); these researchers found that classifying the 
Figure 1a stimuli was a lot easier than classifying the Figure 1b stimuli. The present 
model can explain this result. We created a data set to conform to the Figure 1b 
category structure. As before, the data set had 20 points, 10 points along each of the 
two diagonal strips. Codelength(x,y) was very nearly identical to what we had before 
(for Codelength(x,y) for Figure 1a), 81.70%. This is an expected result, since 
codelength values are rotationally invariant: the simplicity model does not take into 
account the absolute position of points in psychological space, rather it compares 
pairs of distances (e.g., it computes whether distance(A,B) is greater than 
distance(A,C)). Given the high value of Codelength(x,y), according to the simplicity 
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model, there should be little preference for Group(x,y). Codelength(x) was 81.61% 
(compare with the unrotated value: 50.07%) and Codelength(y) was 79.53%. 
Therefore, for Figure 1b a classification bias is not predicted for any of Group(x), 
Group(y), or Group(x,y), consistently with the results of Ashby et al. (1999).  
 As noted above, rotation does not alter the 2d codelength, but it can alter the 
1d vs. 2d advantage. This is because when the data points are rotated, their 1d 
projections change. In Figure 1a there was a well-separated 1d projection, but this is 
not the case in Figure 1b. Note that rotating a data set does not imply that the 
coordinate axes have to be rotated as well. The alignment of the coordinate axes is 
determined by independent, perceptual, considerations (a coordinate axis in 
psychological space can be defined as the direction along which only one aspect of a 
stimulus’ appearance is altered). Therefore, rotation in 2d can alter the advantage of 
the 2d classification relative to the 1d ones, and hence our prediction for 
unidimensional vs. two-dimensional classification.  
 Some of the previous research on 1d vs. 2d classification employed stimuli 
composed of discrete, binary features. Each feature would have two possible values, 
and each value would correspond to different instantiations of the feature. Although 
our model seems to work well with stimuli composed of two continuous dimensions, 
it is also useful to consider its predictions with the main stimulus structure employed 
by Medin et al. (1987) and Regehr and Brooks (1995), shown in Figure 4. These 
investigators reported a preference for unidimensional classification, across a variety 
of procedures and stimulus formats. In order to derive simplicity predictions for the 
Figure 4 stimulus structure, we assumed that the 1,0 values are coordinates in a 
psychological space, and employed the City block metric to compute similarities. This 
is legitimate, since the City block distance between vectors, e.g., 0110 and 0100, 
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effectively corresponds to a count of feature mismatches. Codelength(4d) was 
computed to be 94.84%; the optimal classification in 4d was the same as the one 
assumed by Medin et al. (1987; shown in Figure 4). By contrast, Codelength(1d) was 
only 51.57%. Therefore, our formalism readily explains a preference for 
unidimensional classification, as observed by Medin et al. (1987) and Regehr and 
Brooks (1995). Note that this prediction relates only to the abstract stimulus structure.  
 Medin et al. (1987; Experiment 4) employed an alternative data set, whereby 
items were created on the basis of four trinary-valued dimensions. In that data set, 
Medin et al. claimed that there was no straightforward way to divide the items into 
two groups on the basis of one dimension, as requested in their experiments. Ignoring 
the requirement to classify the items into two categories (which cannot be modeled 
within the simplicity approach), we can still compare Codelength(4d) with 
Codelength(1d). We adopted the same approach as before, assuming now that the 
values 1, 2, 3 of each trinary dimension correspond to coordinates in a psychological 
space (and using the City block metric to compute distances). This approach induces 
an ordering in feature values that are nominal: in other words we assume that feature 
2 is ‘greater’ than feature 1—clearly this is an approximation. However, it should not 
affect the comparison between Codelength(1d) and Codelength (4d) since the same 
ordering of feature values is induced in both 1d and 4d. In this case, the former was 
61.02% and the latter 56.70%. Therefore, with Medin et al.’s (1987) Experiment 4 
data set, a slight preference for 4d classification is predicted. The results of Medin et 
al. (1987) were that this category structure prevented 1d classifications, but did not 
lead to any 4d ones. Medin et al., however, asked their participants to classify the 
stimuli into two groups, a procedure which has been argued to encourage 
unidimensional classification (Murphy, 2004). In other words, where the present 
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model predicts a slight preference for 4d classification, with a procedure that 
encourages 1d classification, much fewer 1d classifications were observed. We take 
this finding to be broadly consistent with the simplicity formalism.  
Note that in both the case of Regehr and Brooks (1995) and Medin et al. 
(1987) some of the stimuli had limited semantic content. However, it would be 
incorrect to perceive the present formalism as applicable in the case of knowledge-
rich stimuli in general. Several investigators have illustrated the complexity of 
interactions between general knowledge and spontaneous categorization (e.g., Heit, 
1997; Lewandowsky, Roberts, & Yang, 2006; Malt & Sloman, 2007; Wisniewski, 
1995), and our formalism would require considerable revision before it can 
accommodate general knowledge effects.  
 In summary, examining previous results on unidimensional vs. 
multidimensional classification shows support for the simplicity approach. However, 
the experimental and analytical tools employed previously may somewhat bias 
spontaneous classification in favor of unidimensional solutions. We discuss these next 





There are two main methodological issues. First, it is important to ensure that the 
experimental procedure does not bias participants to favor, e.g., unidimensional 
classifications. Second, it is clearly important to be able to unambiguously infer 
whether participants are indeed utilizing only one dimension or not.  
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 In spontaneous classification studies participants are regularly asked to divide 
a set of stimuli into two categories. Murphy (2004, p.129) suggested that college-
educated American participants may interpret such a task as a problem-solving one, 
whereby they are asked to identify one critical feature that would enable assignment 
of the stimuli into two groups. Standardized tests in the US often require searching for 
a critical property to distinguish instances and could be the source of such biases in 
classification experiments. Therefore, requiring classification into a fixed number of 
categories may introduce a response bias for unidimensional classifications, 
everything else being equal. Additionally, for a given data set, it is possible that in 2d 
there is a very obvious classification into three groups, while in 1d into two groups. 
Therefore, asking participants to seek a particular number of clusters may bias them to 
take into account both or only one of the available dimensions. To examine 
unidimensional vs. two-dimensional classification, an unconstrained categorization 
procedure may be preferable.  
 With respect to the second issue, in unconstrained spontaneous classification 
there is considerable response variability. For as few as 10 objects there are about 
100,000 possible categorizations (Medin & Ross, 1997). Accordingly, classification 
performance has to be measured in terms of preference towards one classification 
(e.g., Group(x)) against another (e.g., Group(x,y)). This can be achieved with a 
measure of classification similarity, such as the Rand Index (Rand, 1971). The Rand 
Index is a statistic that can be utilized in categorization research, to compare two 
classifications. It is the ratio of pairs of objects that are both in the same cluster, or 
both in different clusters, in the two classifications, divided by all pairs. It varies from 
0 (totally different classifications) to 1 (identical classifications). For example, 
consider a participant who produces a classification X. Does this classification reflect 
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a unidimensional or two-dimensional bias? Compare Rand(X,Group(x)) with 
Rand(X,Group(x,y)). If the second Rand is larger, the participant’s classification is 
more similar to the optimal classification in 2d, Group(x,y), and so we can infer that 
she had a bias for two-dimensional classification; almost.  
 The qualification which needs to be made now relates to the fact that 
Group(x,y) and Group(x) are often in a superordinate/ subordinate relationship with 
respect to each other. To appreciate the relevance of this point, consider again Figure 
1a. A Rand analysis on classification data from Figure 1a could show preference for 
Group(x,y) in either of two ways: first, participants indeed consider more intuitive 
Group(x,y) and so classify the stimuli by taking into account both dimensions. 
Second, participants consider more intuitive Group(x), so they initially classify stimuli 
along dimension x, but subsequently seek subclusters along dimension y (Figure 5). In 
general, people will often seek to generate classification hierarchies, rather than single 
level classifications (e.g., Gosselin & Schyns, 2001). In other words, in Figure 1a, 
Group(x,y) is a classification subordinate to Group(x). So, for a stimulus set as shown 
in Figure 1a, a Rand Index analysis would be of no use in deciding whether there is a 
unidimensional vs. two-dimensional classification bias. Therefore, an appropriate 
stimulus design must involve a situation where Group(x)/Group(y) are not subordinate 
to Group(x,y) and vice versa. To sum up, when studying the issue of 1d vs. 2d 
classification with a spontaneous classification task, the only available empirical 
measure is a participant’s classification. Therefore, the classification corresponding to 
taking into account a single dimension of variation has to be as different as possible 
from the classification taking into account both dimensions of variation. This is why 
the stimulus design of Ashby et al. (1999) is not suitable for the present 
demonstration. 
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---------------------FIGURE 5---------------------- 
 A final issue concerns the format of the stimuli. In categorization research, 
materials are often created in a way that each stimulus can be perceived as an 
individual object, whether this object has some naturalistic appearance (e.g., cartoon-
like characters or animals, as in Medin et al, 1987) or it corresponds to a meaningless 
geometric shape (e.g., lines differing in orientation and length, as in Ashby et al., 
1999). Regehr and Brooks (1995) used stimuli such that each stimulus was a 2d 
arrangement of its features separately. For example, a stimulus could be composed of 
a bottle, a cup, a trumpet, and a cake, enclosed within a rectangle. Milton and Wills 
(2004; Milton, 2006; Handel & Imai, 1972) observed that stimulus format does affect 
unidimensional vs. multidimensional classification, but it was difficult to formulate 
general principles.  
 The simplicity approach can only explain biases arising from the abstract 
stimulus structure, not stimulus format or other procedural details. Therefore, we 
simply chose two-dimensional stimuli that could be perceived as individual objects, as 
is most commonly done in categorization research. Also, we aimed for dimensions of 
physical variation that would be neither particularly separable nor integral, since this 
could potentially influence unidimensional preference (Milton, 2006). Crucially, with 
the Rand Index analysis, it is not necessary to ensure that the stimulus dimensions do 
not introduce a bias for unidimensional vs. multidimensional preference. Suppose that 
the stimulus format encourages multidimensional classification. The Rand Index 
should still reveal a bias for unidimensional classification where one is predicted, 
relative to the condition where multidimensional classification is predicted. That is, 
there should be more of a bias for Group(x) when we predict that Group(x) ought to 
be preferred, compared to when we predict that Group(x,y) should be preferred.  




Forty Cardiff University students took part for course credit. Twenty participants were 
allocated to a condition where a preference for unidimensional classifications was 
predicted, and 20 to a condition where a preference for two-dimensional 
classifications was predicted. An additional 24 paid participants were recruited from 
the Cardiff University student population to provide similarity ratings.  
 Materials 
Stimuli were circles enclosed in squares, with the circles ‘blended in’ with the squares 
(using CorelDraw), so as to make them look more like individual objects (Figure 6). 
The similarity structure for the two conditions (to be discussed shortly) was specified 
on abstract 1-10 scales; therefore, these scales had to be mapped to the physical 
dimensions of circle size and square size. This was done by assuming a Weber’s 
fraction of 7.5% for both the circles (smallest size 25mm) and the squares (smallest 
size: 50mm; Morgan, 2005). Each stimulus was printed individually on a piece of 
paper as large as the stimulus, which was subsequently laminated.  
---------------------FIGURE 6---------------------- 
 As noted, our objective was to create a stimulus structure such that 
Group(x)/Group(y) were not superordinate or subordinate relative to Group(x,y). 
Figure 7 shows such a stimulus structure, for which we predict unidimensional 
classification, since Codelength(x), Codelength(y) are less than Codelength(x,y). 
Notice that in two dimensions there are two barely distinguished clusters, whereas 
along either x or y there are three, reasonably well-separated groups (Group(x), 
Group(y) are predicted to be equally intuitive, but they correspond to different 
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classifications). By contrast, for the items in Figure 8 we predict that participants will 
favor Group(x,y) over either Group(x) or Group(y): in two dimensions there are three 
fairly obvious groups, whereas along either of dimensions x or y there is basically a 
uniform distribution of items. The stimulus sets were created so that the codelengths 
for the optimal classifications in each condition are approximately the same, and 
likewise for the suboptimal ones (of course, in one condition the optimal classification 
is two-dimensional, in the other unidimensional).  
---------------------FIGURES 7,8---------------------- 
 In sum, we have a stimulus set for which unidimensional spontaneous 
classification is predicted and one for which two-dimensional classification is 
predicted, so that the Group(x)/Group(y) classifications in each case are not 
superordinate or subordinate to the Group(x,y) one. 
 Participants may spontaneously classify the stimuli in terms of both or only 
one of the dimensions, but, either way, it is important to establish that they perceived 
the stimuli as we intended them to. We collected similarity ratings from12 
participants for each of our two stimulus sets separately. Participants were instructed 
that their task was to rate the similarity between a number of different items. The 20 
stimuli in either of the two data sets were then sequentially displayed on a computer 
screen in a random order. Stimuli were displayed for 1000 ms each, and each item 
was preceded by a centrally located fixation point, displayed for 250ms. 
Subsequently, participants were instructed that they would have to rate the similarity 
between the stimuli on a scale ranging from 1 (very dissimilar) to 9 (very similar). 
Each trial consisted of a central fixation point (250ms), followed by the first stimulus 
(1000ms), followed by another fixation point (250ms) and the second stimulus 
(1000ms), then the similarity scale, which was visible until a response was made. 
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Participants rated the similarity of all possible stimulus pairs once, excluding pairs of 
identical stimuli, for a total of 380 similarity comparisons. Trials were randomly 
ordered.  
We used the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) procedure to derive a spatial 
representation in 2d for the stimuli, on the basis of their similarity ratings. For the data 
set for which a 1d classification was predicted, the best solution was associated with a 
stress of 0.168 (lower values indicate better solution), and for the data set for which a 
2d classification was predicted stress was 0.149. 
The Orthosim procedure (Barrett et al., 1998) allows the computation of 
various similarity indices between two sets of coordinates for the same set of items. In 
our case, we wished to compare the similarity of the MDS-derived representation for 
the stimuli with the experimenter-assumed coordinates (on the basis of which the 
predictions for unidimensional vs. multidimensional classification were computed). 
We selected a similarity index which adopts a ‘procrustes’ approach (Barrett et al., 
1998), according to which the coordinate configurations to be compared are first 
normalized and rotated/ reflected to remove any of the arbitrariness in MDS solutions 
(with respect to location, scale, and orientation). The Orthosim documentation 
recommends the ‘double-scaled Euclidean distance’ coefficient, for which 0 
corresponds to complete dissimilarity, 1 to identity. The similarity coefficient between 
the coordinates for the data set for which 1d classification was predicted and the 
corresponding MDS solution was 0.74 and for the data set for which 2d classification 
was predicted 0.72. In evaluating these results, note that the similarity ratings 
procedure leads to very noisy data, for a number of reasons: a similarity scale is a 
rather insensitive measure of similarity perception and the ratings task is so long that 
participants often get tired and less careful with their responses. Alternative similarity 
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procedures, such as confusability ratings, are not appropriate in our case, since our 
stimuli are highly discriminable relative to each other. Overall, we consider the 
similarity between the experimenter assumed coordinates and the corresponding MDS 
solutions adequate.  
A final issue that needs to be addressed is whether our predictions might be 
valid after some radical restructuring of the similarity space, as a result of processing 
the stimuli. For example, what if participants gradually represented the stimuli 
corresponding to Figure 8 on the basis of a single, composite, emergent dimension 
along the diagonal? Such a possibility seems very unlikely. First, we are not aware of 
any process of perceptual learning which posits the emergence of such composite 
dimensions of variation. Second, such radical restructuring of the similarity space 
would require extensive learning, rather than casual processing of the stimuli, as was 
the case in our experiments (e.g., Goldstone, 1994, 2000).  
Procedure 
Participants were presented with one of the two stimulus sets and asked to categorize 
the items in a ‘natural and intuitive way’. They were told that they could use as many 
groups as they wanted, but no more than they felt necessary. Participants received the 
stimuli in a randomly ordered stack and subsequently spread them out on a table to 
determine the preferred classification, by arranging the stimuli into piles. Participants 
were free to compare the stimuli in any way they wished, and to make alterations to 
any initial groups they formed.  
 Results 
Our objective was to examine when participants were more likely to generate 
classifications similar to Group(x)/Group(y) vs. Group(x,y). As mentioned before, 
classification variability is so great so as to prohibit any analysis that involves 
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frequency of occurrence of different classifications (Medin & Ross, 1997); therefore, 
the Rand Index was employed.   
 Each participant generated a classification. If a participant was biased to prefer 
e.g. Group(x) over and above Group(x,y), then we would expect the Rand similarity 
between the participant’s classification and Group(x) to be higher than between the 
participant’s classification and Group(x,y). Accordingly, for all participants in each 
condition separately, we computed the Rand similarity of the classifications they 
produced with Group(x), Group(y), and Group(x,y) (for each condition the optimal 
classifications are different). Note that participants might prefer Group(x) over 
Group(y) if the squares dimension is more salient than the circles one. We are not 
interested in such differences, but rather in when either Group(x) or Group(y) is 
preferred over Group(x,y). Accordingly, we infer unidimensional preference if Rand 
similarity to Group(x) or Group(y) is greater than to Group(x,y), and two-dimensional 
preference otherwise.  
 The dependent variable was the similarity of participants’ classifications to 
Group(x), Group(y), and Group(x,y), as computed by the Rand Index. One two-way 
ANOVA was run with ‘condition’ as a between-participants factor and ‘similarity to 
Group(x) vs. Group(x,y)’ as a within-participants factor. A second two-way ANOVA 
was run with ‘condition’ as a between-participants factor again and ‘similarity to 
Group(y) vs. Group(x,y)’ as the within-participants factor. In both cases the 
interaction between the two factors was significant (Figure 9; F(1,38) = 326.819, 
p<.0005 and F(1,38) = 48.290, p<.0005, respectively). In the case where we predicted 
unidimensional classification, the similarity of participants’ classifications to 
Group(x,y) was less than to both the similarity to Group(x) and similarity to Group(y), 
as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests (t(19) = -11.057, p<.0005, 
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and t(19) = -2.951, p=.004, respectively). In the case where we predicted two-
dimensional classification, similarity to Group(x,y) was greater than both the 
similarity to Group(x) and similarity to Group(y), assessed in the same way (t(19) = 
21.731, p<.0005, and t(19) = 6.441, p<.0005, respectively). 
---------------------FIGURE 9---------------------- 
 
 Other models 
SUSTAIN spontaneously classifies a set of stimuli on the basis of more than one 
dimensions when (and for) dimensions which are highly intercorrelated with each 
other. Therefore, we can examine the correlations between the dimensions in the two 
datasets we employed. For the data set for which 1d classification was predicted, the 
correlation between the two dimensions was .763 (p < .01) and for the data set for 
which 2d classification was predicted, the correlation was nearly identical, .760 (p < 
.01). However, in one case we predicted 1d classification and in the other 2d 
classification. Therefore, the simplicity model specifies a bias for 1d vs. 2d 
classification that is separate from the one derived from SUSTAIN. Note, however, 
that this may be an unfair comparison: SUSTAIN is a model of incremental learning, 
whereas the simplicity approach was specifically designed to be applicable in 
situations when all the stimuli appear simultaneously (cf. simplicity models of 
perceptual organization; e.g., Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986). Note also that the 
simplicity approach predicts that classification intuitiveness remains unchanged by 
adding dimensions perfectly correlated with existing ones (recall, that the simplicity 
model does not encode absolute point locations, rather pairs of similarities). However, 
methodologically it is very difficult to examine whether spontaneous categorization 
involves two correlated dimensions, instead of a single one (or an emergent one that 
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subsumes the two correlated dimensions). Billman and Knutson (1996) reported that 
correlated dimensions facilitate the learning of a target rule, but the link between 
spontaneous generation of categories and unsupervised learning is not straightforward 
(cf. Murphy, 2004).  
 Models of supervised categorization that employ free parameters for 
attentional weighting can, of course, describe the reported results. However, without 
some constraints on determining these parameters a priori, it is unclear as to how such 
models can predict our results (e.g., Nosofsky, 1989). Additionally, there are other 
approaches of unsupervised categorization which we did not consider at all (e.g., 
Compton and Logan, 1993; Schyns, 1991). The emphasis on SUSTAIN and the 
Rational Model has been guided by a number of considerations (similar points apply 
to the simplicity model). First, several researchers have recently made compelling 
arguments for the relevance of simplicity and Bayesian principles in modeling human 
cognition (e.g., Chater, 1999; Feldman, 2000; Tenenbaum et al., 2006). The Rational 
Model was specifically developed as a Bayesian model of category learning; an 
important component of SUSTAIN’s operation is a principle of surprisingness, which 
can be interpreted in simplicity terms. Second, both models are flexible enough to 
allow predictions across a variety of modeling situations, without modification (e.g., 
regardless of whether stimuli are represented in terms of features or continuous 
dimensions of variation). It would be undesirable to consider models that could not (in 
principle) be applied to the range of results examined in this work. Third, they have a 
limited number of reasonably well-constrained parameters. In fact, in both cases 
model parameters are often treated as fixed (the coupling parameter in the Rational 
Model is often just set at 0.5; Love et al., 2004, did not optimize SUSTAIN 
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parameters for each of their demonstrations separately). Finally, SUSTAIN has 
specifically been applied to the problem of 1d vs. 2d classification.   
 Finally, can our results be captured by a statistical clustering algorithm (for a 
review with an emphasis on psychological categorization see Pothos and Chater, 
2002; more generally, see, Fisher & Langley, 1990 or Krzanowski & Marriott, 1995)? 
Note that a statistical algorithm must have some psychological interpretation before it 
can be considered as a candidate explanation for human categorization. Certain 
versions of K-means clustering are a possibility, since they can identify clusters 
maximizing within cluster similarity while minimizing between cluster similarity. 
However, they require information about the number of categories sought (K). As 
noted above, such information may prejudice the issue of whether a unidimensional or 
multidimensional classification is optimal. 
 
Discussion  
When participants are asked to spontaneously categorize a set of objects, will they 
take into account only one of the objects’ dimensions or all of them? Most empirical 
results argue in favor of a unidimensional preference (Ashby et al., 1999; Medin et al., 
1987; Regehr & Brooks, 1995). A preference for multidimensional classification has 
been observed, by manipulating the stimulus format and experimental procedure (e.g., 
Handel & Imai, 1972; Milton, 2006), or by providing a causal scenario to relate the 
dimensions of a set of objects (Medin et al., 1987). To our knowledge, ours is the first 
empirical demonstration showing a two-dimensional bias in spontaneous 
classification, on the basis of the abstract stimulus structure. We were able to predict 
unidimensional vs. two-dimensional preference, by employing Pothos and Chater’s 
(2002) simplicity model of spontaneous classification. We proposed that people prefer 
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unidimensional classification when the (optimal) classification along any single 
dimension is more intuitive than the classification taking into account both 
dimensions, and vice versa. Our results support the simplicity approach, and illustrate 
that the stimuli/ procedure we employed could not have had a confounding influence, 
since with stimuli of exactly the same format we could predict both unidimensional 
and two-dimensional classification.  
The empirical test of our hypothesis involved two methodological innovations. 
First, we used the Rand Index of classification similarity, which allowed us to employ 
an unconstrained categorization procedure. As Murphy (2004) argued, requiring 
participants to divide the items into a fixed number of dimensions may favor 
unidimensional classification. Second, we recognized that data sets as in Figure 1a 
make it difficult to establish unambiguously unidimensional vs. two-dimensional 
classification, since (in this case) the former is superordinate to the latter (Figure 5). 
Thus, stimulus structures had to be specified where the optimal unidimensional 
classification was not related to the optimal two-dimensional classification in a 
superordinate/subordinate way (Figures 7, 8).  
 Research into unidimensional vs. multidimensional classification may shed 
light on Goodman’s paradox. Goodman (1972; see also Goldstone, 1994; Pothos, 
2005; Sloman & Rips, 1998) observed that any two items may be understood as 
arbitrarily similar, depending on which of their properties are considered. For 
example, a giraffe and a house can both be very similar if one considers the fact that 
they both weigh less than 10 tons, less then 11 tons etc. (cf. Barsalou, 1991). Of 
course, when considering such properties, our natural intuition is that they are 
nonsense and ought to be ignored. Strong as this intuition is, it has been difficult to 
formalize. A possible partial solution is that a novel set of stimuli ought to be 
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perceived only with the dimensions that lead to the most intuitive classification for the 
stimuli (cf. Kruschke, 2006; Nosofsky, 1989). In other words, the flexibility of 
similarity could be constrained by observing which subset of possible object 
dimensions lead to well-formed categories. Note, however, that understanding 
similarity/representation has proved an immensely complicated problem in 
psychology (Griffiths, Steyvers, & Tenenbaum, 2007), and the above idea is likely to 
provide only a partial solution. For example, there is ample evidence that similarity 
judgments can be also be constrained by considering general knowledge influences 
(Heit, 1997; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998). 
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Appendix: A short description of the simplicity model 
 
Computations for the simplicity model involve three steps.  
 
First, we compute the information-theoretic codelength required to describe the 
similarity structure of a set of objects, without any categories. This is done by 
considering all pairs of similarities. For example, for four objects A, B, C, and D, we 
are interested in whether  
sim(A,B) >< sim(A,D) 
sim(A,B) >< sim(A,C) 
sim(A,B) >< sim(B,D) 
sim(A,B) >< sim(B,C) 
etc.  
Note that determining each of these inequalities is worth one bit of information, since 
there are only two possibilities (equalities are ignored; in real life this is not a 
problem, in practice the formalism is slightly adjusted to take into account equalities). 
For example, for 10 objects, there are 10*(10-1)/2 = 45 similarities (assuming 
symmetry and minimality), hence there are 990 pairs of similarities. Thus, to describe 
the similarity structure of 10 objects, a codelength of 990 bits is required.  
 
Second, categories impose constraints on the similarity structure of the items. 
Specifically, define categories as implying that all within category similarities are 
greater than all between category similarities. For example, suppose that 10 objects 
can be divided into two perfect categories (that is, no constraints are violated). Then, 
in each category we have five items, and so 5*(5-1)/2=10 within category similarities. 
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In both categories together we have 20 within category similarities. Also, we have 
5*5 between category similarities. Therefore, in total, there are 20*25=500 
constraints. So, with categories, to describe the similarity structure of the items almost 
(see below) 990-500=490 bits are required. In Pothos and Chater’s (2002) model it is 
this information-theoretic simplification that makes categorization useful.  
 
Third, we need to encode the particular classification that is utilized. This is done 
using Stirling’s number, (1)v (n  v) r
(n v)!v!v0n , which tells us the number of ways in 
which r items can be divided into n categories. The increase in codelength due to this 
term is typically small. Also, in general some of the constraints imposed by a 
classification will be wrong, and we have to correct them. If we have u constraints 





e!(u  e)! .  
 
Overall, the codelength for the similarity structure for a set of objects is reduced by 
the constraints of the classification, but increased by having to correct for errors and 
to specify the classification. The lower the overall codelength, the more intuitive the 
classification is predicted to be, in accord with the algorithmic simplicity framework 
of Minimum Description Length (Risannen, 1989).  
 
Simplicity model code in C++ is available from the authors.  
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Figures: 
 
Figure 1. Two of the data sets employed by Ashby at al. (1999). (The data sets are not 
identical to the ones used by Ashby et al.) Here and elsewhere the dimensions x and y 
are assumed to correspond to dimensions of physical variation. For the ‘a’ data set, 
participants preferred to classify the items along the single dimension x (the 
perforated line shows the preferred classification), rather than produce classifications 
compatible with both dimensions x, y. For the ‘b’ data set, none of the participants 
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Figure 2. The simplicity model can evaluate the relative intuitiveness of different 
classifications for the same set of objects. In this case, the classification on the left is 
predicted as more intuitive (and will be associated with a smaller codelength), as it 
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Figure 3. For the objects in the left-hand panel, the best possible classification is 
associated with a smaller codelength, than the best possible classification for the 
objects in the right-hand panel (for which there are very weak intuitions about any 
classification). Such differences reflect the intuition that different sets of objects could 
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Figure 4. The abstract stimulus structure employed by Medin et al. (1987) and Regehr 
and Brooks (1995). The first column indicates the assumed optimal classification of 
the items, if all four dimensions are taken into account (this is the FR, or family 
resemblance, classification). In boldface are shown the assumed prototypes of each 
category (in 4d).  
 
 
FR sort     
Category D1 D2 D3 D4 
a 1 1 1 1 
a 1 1 1 0 
a 1 1 0 1 
a 1 0 1 1 
a 0 1 1 1 
b 0 0 0 0 
b 0 0 0 1 
b 0 0 1 0 
b 0 1 0 0 
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Figure 5. Participants might either classify the stimuli two-dimensionally, producing 
clusters A, B, C, D, E, F, or they might first classify the stimuli unidimensionally 
along x (as we would expect), producing clusters 1, 2, and then subsequently look for 
subclusters within 1 and 2, so that the end classification would also be A, B, C, D, E, 
F. Thus, a stimulus set like that of Figure 1a is unsuitable for studying unidimensional 
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Figure 6. A few examples of the stimuli employed in the present study. The stimulus on the left shows the greatest size in the square dimension, 
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Figure 7. A stimulus structure where the simplicity approach predicts that participants 
will prefer a unidimensional classification (the 1d classifications are shown). Where 
there are two numbers next to a point, this means that two identical items were 
included in the stimulus set. The most intuitive classification along x is (1,2,3,4,11,12) 
(5,6,7,8,15,16) (9,10,13,14,17,18,19,20) and along y (1,2,3,4,9,10) (5,6,7,8,13,14) 
(11,12,15,16,17,18,19,20), both with a codelength of 57.6%, and the most intuitive 
classification along xy is (1,2,3,4,9,10,11,12) (5,6,7,8,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20) with a 
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Figure 8. A stimulus structure where the simplicity approach predicts that participants 
will prefer the two-dimensional classification (the 2d classification is shown). The 
most intuitive classification along x is (1,2,3,4,9,11,13,14,17,19) 
(5,6,7,8,10,12,15,16,18,20) and along y (1,2,3,5,10,11,15,16,17,19) 
(4,6,7,8,9,12,13,14,18,20), both with a codelength of 73.5%, and the most intuitive 
classification along xy is (1,2,11,17,19) (3,4,5,6,9,10,13,14,15,16) (7,8,12,18,20) with 
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Figure 9. The Rand Index analyses results. ‘Rand to x’ means Rand similarity of 
participants’ classifications to Group(x) etc. ‘Unidimensional Preference’ refers to the 
condition where simplicity predicts a preference for unidimensional classification. 
‘Two-dimensional Preference’ refers to the condition where simplicity predicts a 


















Rand to x Rand to y Rand to xy
Unidimensional Preference Two-dimensional Preference
 
 
 
